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of 1969 1 has been
heralded as a dramatic modification of federal agency decision-making.
The Act, commonly called NEPA, had three major objectives. First, it
established a government-wide obligation to include environmental factors in
the activities of federal agencies. 2 Second, it created the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to serve as an advisor to the President on
environmental issues. 3 And third, it mandated a comprehensive environmental review of all "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 4 The required environmental review quickly assumed
the form of the Environmental Impact Statement or EIS. Prompted by
judicial interpretation and guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality ,5 federal agencies in the early 1970's began to prepare EIS' son a wide
variety of federal, federally-assisted and federally-licensed activities. 6 For
example, Army Corps of Engineer dams, Department of Transportationfunded highway projects, Environmental Protection Agency-assisted wastewater treatment plants fell within NEPA's broad scope.
Compliance with NEPA did not come easily. Many agencies viewed the
NEPA requirements merely as burdensome paperwork without substantive
importance. Most federal agencies eventually realized after a considerable
body of federal court decisions were handed down, that good-faith
compliance with the Act, rather than continued litigation and project delays,
would better serve their agency purposes in the long term. 7 Consequently, as

T

HE PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
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1
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 Stat. 852 (1969) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976)).
2 National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
3 National Environmental Policy Act§§ 202-204, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4344 (1976).
4 National Environmental Policy Act§ l02(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
5
CEQ Guidelines on Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 40 C.F.R. § 1500
(1977). The Council on Environmental Quality recently proposed comprehensive amendments
to their Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 25230-47 (1978). These proposed regulations address the issue of
duplicative environmental review requirements and seek, in a general way, to streamline the
federal review process. See also note 12 infra.
6
See generally, F. ANDERSON & R. DANIELS, NEPA IN THE CouRTS (1973); Anderson, The
National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL Environmental Law 238. (E.L. Dolgin & T.G.P.
Guilbert eds. 1974).
7
See generally, Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL Environmental Law 238 (E.L. Dolgin & T.C.P. Guilbert eds. 1974).
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the decade progressed, EIS's were prepared on an increasing number of
federal activities. In addition, many agencies implemented policies which
required an environmental assessment or report to be prepared on all agency
projects and programs whether or not an EIS was required. 8 Usually these
assessments and reports served as the basis for decisions on whether the
activity required a full EIS. For projects not constituting a "major federal
action" or not "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
the assessment was often utilized as a sub-NEPA environmental planning
document.
It can be argued that the development of environmental planning
capabilities and concern has been NEPA's greatest accomplishment.
Enlightened federal agencies no longer see NEPA solely as a statutory
paperwork requirement which must be satisfied before an activity may
proceed. More importantly, NEPA represents a planning process which
allows environmental considerations to be given at least some weight with
technical and economic factors in the development of federal program
actions and altematives. 9
NEPA, however, is not the only federal environmental review statute to be
found in the United States Code. The concept of a comprehensive review
process under NEPA is complicated by the existence of over 30 other federal
statutes which impose environmental requirements upon federal activities. 10
s For example, the Environmental Protection Agency requires an environmental assessment
of its sewage treatment plant construction projects whether or not a full NEPA-mandated
environmental impact statement will ultimately be necessary. See, 43 Fed. Reg. 44064 (1978) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 35.925-8).
9 One recent commentary, however, has indicated a rejection of the commonly held premise
that NEPA has "brought of a new day in responsible agency decision-making" and has
constituted an important "action forcing" mechanism resulting in environmentally beneficial
federal actions. See, Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 SCIENCE 743 (1978).
Professor Fairfax writes:
I suggest that NEPA does not constitute a new approach to administrative •eform and is
actually a poor vehicle for a reformation of agency decision-making. Litigation under
NEPA and preoccupation with the NEPA process truncated pre-existing and potentially
significant developments in the definition of agency responsibility for environmental
protection and in citizen involvement in agency deliberative processes. It turned
environmentalists' efforts away from questioning and redefining agencies' powers and
responsibilities and focused them instead on analyzing documents. This preoccupation
has led to a misallocation of the environmental movement's resources.
I d.
10 16 U .S.C. § 20 (1976); Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, as amended, 49 U .S.C.
§ 1716 (1976); Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7l9-7l9o (1976);
Anadromous Fish Conservation Act, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§§ 757a-757f (1976); Bald and Golden
Eagle Protection Act, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§§ 668-668d (1976); Classification and Multiple Use
Act of 1964,43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1976); Clean Air Act ofl970,asamended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18571858a (1976); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976);
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U .S.C.§§ 1501-1524 (1976); Department of Transportation Act of
1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976); Department of Transportation Actofl966, as amended, 49 U .S.C.§
1653(f) (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976);
Energy Conservation and Production Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976); Energy
Conservation in Existing Buildings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6851-6892 (1976); Energy
Conservation Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6831-6840 (1976); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976); Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (1976); Estuarine Areas Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 12211226 (1976); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 109, § 128, § 138 (1976);
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976); Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1976); Federal Energy Administration Act of
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NEPA can be distinguished from these other statutes since it requires a
comprehensive examination of the impact of a federal activity upon all
aspects of the environment while most of the other federal environmental
review statutes are directed at a single environmental medium or concern
(i.e., air, water, wildlife habitat, endangered species). Environmental review
requirements in each of these statutes and the executive orders issued
pursuant to them place additional responsibilities on federal agencies
beyond those already imposed by NEPA. These provisions impose what
can be generally described as specialized environmental review requirements. As will be shown, compliance with NEPA, even to the extent of
preparation of a full EIS, will not necessarily satisfy these specialized statutes.
In addition, these requirements are implemented by separate procedural
regulations; each statute may have its own regulation. The CEQ environmental impact statement guidelines and individual agency NEPA regulations, at
best, can only partially satisfy any of the specialized statutes. Separate
documents are in many cases needed to comply with each statute.
Many of the specialized review statutes require "consultation" or
"coordination" with the federal agency administering that law.U Review
statutes are administered by several different federal agencies thus requiring
many federal activities to go through a number of consultations. Some of the
specialized statutes impose substantive as well as procedural requirements.
These statutory requirements may govern the final disposition of the federal
activity as well as the review procedures that must be followed in the decision
making process. Other requirements are purely procedural and thus more
akin to the NEPA requirements.
The aggressiveness with which these statutes and orders have been
implemented in the past has varied markedly. Some have been recognized by
1974, as amended, 15 U.S. C. §§ 761-790h (1976); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act, as amended, 7 U .S.C. §§ 121-136y (1976); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1976); Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of March 10, 1934, as amended, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 661-666c (1976); Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, as
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976); Fur Seal Act of 1966, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ ll51ll86 (1976); Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-469i
(1976); Land and Water Conservation Act of 1965, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 460 (1976); Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended, 16 U .S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976); Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444, 16 U.S.C. §§ 14311434 (1976); Materials Act of 1947, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1976); Mineral Leasing Act for
Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-353 (1976); MineraiLeasingActof 1920, as amended, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 181, 182, 185 (1976); Mining Law of 1872, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976); Multiple UseSustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U .S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976); National Historic Preservation Act of
1966, as amended, 16 U .S.C.§ 470 (1976); National Park System Mining Regulation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1912 (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976); Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6987 (1976}; Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, as amended, 33 U .S.C.§§ 401466n (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (1976}; Solid Waste Disposal Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976); TaylorGrazingActofl934,asamended,43 U.S.C. §§
315, 315a, 315e, 315f (1976}; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); TransAlaska PipelineAuthorizationAct,43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1976); Urban Mass Transportation Act
of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1602, § 1610 (1976); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, as amended, 16
U.S.C. ~§ 1271-1287 (1976); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ ll31-ll36 (1976).
11
See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U .S.C. § 661 (1976), and National Historic
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976).
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federal agencies for a number of years. Others, although legally binding, have
been actively enforced only in recent years. The reasons for this uneven
treatment are numerous. Administering agencies have in some cases not had
sufficient resources to implement their statutes. Also, the applicability of
certain of the requirements to different types of federal activities has been
disputed. Some environmental review requirements have until recently
simply been ignored by the government, interest groups and the public.
To date the courts have played only a limited role in assuring compliance
with the specialized review laws. The most recent statutes have had very little
judicial interpretation. Other statutes have been briefly discussed in decisions
which rely primarily on NEPA requirements. Unfortunately these decisions
tend to confuse the specialized review requirements more than clarify them.
Within the last several years, however, courts have begun to pay more
attention to the specialized statutes in their own right. This has been prompted
in part by increased interest in these laws by environmental organizations and
other interest groups. In some cases, having failed to stop or modify a federal
project on NEPA grounds, environmental litigants have turned to the
specialized statutes for help. Environmental groups have also used these laws
to influence federal agencies' decision-making in administrative proceedings.
Thus, these requirements have had an impact in situations short of actual
litigation.
The effect of specialized environmental review statutes on federal
activities will continue to grow. Their increasing importance and their
tendency to overlap NEPA, and occasionally each other, will certainly
complicate federal environmental review and planning processes. Although
there are several ongoing efforts to streamline the procedures generated by
these statutes, 12 government officials, planners, lawyers and others will
undoubtedly have to live with the present framework for at least the near
future. With that premise in mind, this article will analyze five major
specialized environmental review statutes which affect the greatest number of
federal activities, including 1) the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of
1958; 13 2) the Endangered Species Act of 1973; 14 3) the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966; 15 4) the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1974; 16 5) the

12

President Carter, in his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress, stated:
Today, before any federal agency can construct a new project, or grant funds to local
or state governments, or issue a permit to a private party, it must comply with more than
a score of different environmental review requirements. I have directed the Council on
Environmental Quality to examine the present federal environmental review
requirements and to recommend specific measures, including legislation, to clarify and
integrate them in a way compatible with my broader proposals for governmental
reorganization. 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 794 (May 23, 1977).
The study requested by the President is now underway at CEQ. The study will hopefully
resolve some of the issues raised in this article. To assist this effort, the Council on Environmental
Quality has recently issued a new NEPA regulation to replace the previous NEPA guidelines. 43
Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978). The regulation was mandated by Executive Order 11991 issued by
President Carter on May 24, 1977. 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 808 (May 24, 1977).
13
16 u.s.c. § 661 (1976).
14
16 u.s.c. § 1531 (1976).
15
16 u.s.c. § 470 (1976).
16
16 u.s.c. § 1274 (1976).

1978]

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

199

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 17 and will evaluate their existing
judicial interpretations, identify emerging trends in the law, highlight the
problems that have arisen owing to the proliferation of environmental statutes
and finally offer suggestions for the future.
I.

FISH AND WILDLIFE CooRDINATION

Acr

The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA} 18 is one of the oldest
federal environmental review statutes. The Act was originally passed in 1934 19
and amended in 1946, 20 in 195821 and again in 1965. 22 It has had a substantial
impact on the planning and development of certain types of federal projects,
particularly U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dam projects and other major
federal construction activities directly affecting navigable waters. The effect
of the Act on other types of federal activities has varied significantly. This is
due to a number of factors including: 1) lack of resom~es in the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS}, 23 2) legal questions on the applicability of the Act to
certain types of federal activities, 3) recalcitrance on the part of certain
federal agencies to comply with the law, and 4) the passage of NEPA which
has, in part, overshadowed the Act.
The environmental review requirements of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act are found in section 662(a}. 24 This section provides in part
that:
. . . whenever the waters of any stream or other body of water
are proposed or authorized to be impounded, diverted, the channel
deepened, or the stream or other body of water otherwise controlled
or modified for any purpose whatever, including navigation and
drainage by any department or agency of the United States, or by
any public or private agency under Federal permit or license, such
department or agency first shall consult with the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service . . . with a view to the conservation of
wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage to such
resources as well as providing for the development and improvement thereof in connection with such water resource development.
(emphasis supplied). 25
In addition, section 662(b) further requires that the reports and

16 u.s.c. §1451 (1976).
"16 u.s.c. § 661 (1976).
'"Act of March 10, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 401 (1934).
20
Act of August 14, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-732, 60 Stat. 1080 (1934).
21
Act of August 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (1958).
22
Act of July 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-72, 79 Stat. 213 (1965).
21
' Possibly the most serious problem confronting the administration of the Act has been a lack
of resources on the part of the Fish and Wildlife Service. This has restricted the Service's ability to
provide the technical expertise needed to adequately review the increasing number of federal
activities subject to the Act. In many cases, the Service has simply declined to review projects for
this reason. See, e.g., Sun Industries Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).
24
16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
2 -' ld.
17
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recommendations of the Secretary of Interior on "the wildlife aspects of such
projects" be made an integral part of all federal agency reports submitted for
congressional authorization or administrative approval of water resource
projects. 26 The reports of the Secretary under the Act must include proposed
measures for mitigating or compensating damage to wildlife resources
resulting from the project. Furthermore, the federal agency proposing the
project is required to "give full consideration to the report and recommendations" of the Secretary and to include in project plans "such justifiable
means and measures for wildlife purposes as the reporting agency finds
should be adopted to obtain maximum overall project benefits." 27
Despite being on the statute books for over forty years, no comprehensive
regulation has ever been promulgated setting forth procedures for complying
with the consultation and reporting requirements of the Act. Procedural
details have been left to interagency agreements, project agency regulations,
and program guidance documents issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service.
There have been many recent recommendations, including one from the
President's Council on Environmental Quality, that the FWS develop such a
regulation to put uniformity into the Act's implementation. 28
The environmental review provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act have not received extensive judicial review. With the enactment of
NEPA, FWCA issues have gradually been subsumed in the cases which
examine the procedural or substantive adequacy of environmental impact
statements. This is contrary to the trend seen recently in the courts giving
independent status to other environmental review statutes. 29 However, a brief
analysis of the Act's case law history reveals several important points which
shed some light on the future of these provisions.
First, from the standpoint of the private litigant, there is serious question
whether such a party may bring suit under section 662 to require interagency
consultation. An early decision, Rank v. Krug, 30 stated that citizens could not
force compliance with this duty since it "is lodged with regularly selected
officials whose duties are clearly defined by statute, any more than a private
citizen could step in and assun :e the duties of prosecuting attorney or
govemor."31 Although this sentiment seems out of place at a time when there is
substantial citizen enforcement of governmental environmental obligations,
it has been reiterated in a number of recent federal court decisions. 32 In the

26

16 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1976).

27

ld.

2'

On March 16, 1978, the Council on Environmental Quality issued a memorandum entitled
"Draft recommendations of the Council on Environmental Quality on measures to simplify,
coordinate and codify federal wildlife law" (on file at office of Cleveland State Law Review).
One of the CEQ proposals in this document was that "a single set of procedural regulations
implementing the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and binding all federal agencies, should be
promulgated after full participation by relevant federal and state agencies and other interested
parties." To date no final action has been taken by Interior or the Corps on either the NWF
petition or the CEQ recommendation.
29
See text accompanying note 1, supra, passim.
30 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
31
Id. at 801.
32
See, Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).

1978]

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

201

most recent of these cases, County of Trinity v. Andrus,33 the district court
flatly held that "no private right of action arises under" the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act. 34 This attitude may reflect the judicial opinion that the
consultation and reporting requirements of the FWCA can be satisfied by a
procedurally and substantively adequate environmental impact statement.
Such a view destroys the independent vitality of the FWCA and effectively
reduces its section 662(a) and (b) requirements to "include" components of an
EIS.
Another line of cases indicates support for the view that compliance with
NEPA serves to satisfy the FWCA requirements. Two early cases, Zabel v.
Tabb 35 and Akers v. Resor,36 appeared to reflect an interest in reconciling the
two statutes and giving them both recognition. However, cases following
Zabel and Akers have been structured in a way to give NEP A claims primary
emphasis. 37 For example, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 38 the court found that good faith compliance with NEPA
automatically constituted compliance with the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. This result does not clarify the relationship between the two statutes.
It may be best explained by the fact that the NEPA environmental impact
statement was viewed as the forum for raising all environmental concerns.
However, as will be seen, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
TVA v. Hill 39 appears to cast doubt on such a result since the Court in that case
applied the requirements of another specialized environmental review
statute, the Endangered Species Act, in such a way to give it independent
significance apart from NEPA.
Additionally courts have ignored the specific procedural consultation
requirements imposed by section 662(a) of the FWCA and also the section
662(b) reporting obligation of the Department of the Interior. Instead,
judicial review has focused upon the environmental impact statement to
determine if there has been a departure "from the Congressional intent or
policies of (the FWCA ]." 4°Consequently the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act issue has been reduced merely to a component of the court's EIS analysis.
Too often the only question raised is whether the EIS mentioned the fish and
wildlife impacts of the proposed project. With that issue resolved in the
affirmative, challenges based upon the FWCA have been dismissed. In Save
Our Invaluable Land (SOIL) Inc. v. Needham, 41 reviewing the adequacy of
an Army Corps of Engineers EIS for a dam project, the Tenth Circuit
eliminated the FWCA-based claim by summarily stating that, "(l]n preparing

33

438 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
Id. at 1383.
35
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
36
339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.O. Tenn. 1972).
37
Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.O. Va.), aff'd 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, aff'd 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Save our
Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 387 F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1974).
'" 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
39
98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 74-89 infra.
4
° Cape Henry BirdCiubv. Laird,359F.Supp.404, 418 (W.O. Va.1973).
41
542 F.2d 539 (lOth Cir. 1976).
34

202

CLEVELANDSTATELAWREVIEW

[Vo1.27: 195

its EIS the Corps did not ignore the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of
1958" 42 (emphasis supplied).
Drawing from these recent cases it seems apparent that specific
procedural and substantive requirements of the FWCA have not been
independently considered by courts in the context of EIS review. The courts
have conceived of the FWCA as a restatement of the NEPA obligations to
consider wildlife impacts in an environmental impact statement. An EIS
which discusses wildlife effects will often be found to "satisfy" the FWCA in a
vague, non-specific way. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 43 Judge Eisele went so far as to say it would be unreasonable to
require the Corps to comply with NEPA and the FWCA separately. Such a
statement reflects the judicial perception that NEPA and the FWCA are
overlapping statutes covering the same concerns, and that, since the NEPAmandated EIS is required to be a comprehensive appraisal of all
environmental effects of a project, it will suffice to satisfy the FWCA
obligations.
The position that satisfaction of the NEPA EIS requirement also satisfies
the FWCA is incorrect for a number of reasons. (l) The FWCA imposes
specific procedural and substantive requirements different from those of
NEPA. There is no reason why these obligations of currently applicable
federal law should not be given full force and effect. (2) Even if the NEPA
environmental impact statement is to be considered the proper procedural
"vehicle" for complying with the FWCA, there might be an inadequate form
of judicial review then applied to the substantive elements of theW ildlife Act.
It is not yet settled whether or not NEPA mandates substantive review of
agency decisions. 44 If an EIS is examined to determine FWCA compliance
without regard to the specific requirments of the FWCA, then these
substantive concerns could be entirely outside the scope of judicial review. (3)
The FWCA contains consultation and evaluation procedures which should be
integrated into agency project planning at an early stage. Since Congress has
specifically recognized fish and wildlife interests as deserving of special
consideration, the role of the Department of Interior should not be reduced to
merely commenting on another agency's draft and final environmental
impact statements. If Congress wished to repeal the requirements of the
FWCA, it could do so. As yet, it has not taken such action.
A recent Second Circuit decision has recognized the importance of the
FWCA section 662(a) interagency consultation requirements. In Sun
Industries Ltd. v. Train, 45 the plaintiff challenged the issuance by the
Environmental Protection Agency of a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit to a sewage treatment facility on the
grounds that EPA had not satisfied the FWCA. EPA had sent its draft permit
to the Department of the Interior for the necessary consultation consisting of
review and comment. It received in return a statement of "no action" by
Interior attributable to insufficient funding and personnel in its Fish and
I d. at 543.
325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
44
W. RoDGERS, ENviRONMENTAL LAw 741 at n.23 (1977).
45
394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).

42
43
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Wildlife Service. Acting upon this purported waiver of the FWCA
requirements and in conformance with its own regulations EPA issued the
NPDES permit. Sun Enterprises then sued to challenge EPA's action.
Although the case was resolved primarily on the issue of judicial review
under section 509 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 46 the court did
address the waiver attempted by the Fish and Wildlife Service. The court
totally rejected the Interior Department's claim that it could refuse to review
submission from other federal agencies. It found no legislative intent for such
an abdication of responsibility and gave no support to EPA's regulations
recognizing such a waiver. In addition, the appellate court rebuffed the
government's defense of inadequate funding resources by noting that the
Department of Interior had not even sought appropriations. 47 This case is
significant because it accords the FWCA section 662(a) requirement respect
which is notably lacking in the prior decisions discussed above. Without
significant discussion, the court made the threshold determination that the
section 662 requirements apply to the issuance of NPDES permits; it is
arguable that the statutory language and intent would not call for such a
result. 48
The court's application of the FWCA consultation requirements in the Sun
Industries case can possibly be explained by unique provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. All EPA actions under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act except for wastewater treatment grants and new source
performance standards are specifically exempted from NEPA requirements.49 Therefore, the decision to issue the NPDES permit in the Sun
Industries case was not subject to direct EIS analysis. In this situation the court
may have concluded that the FWCA consultation procedures were necessary
to protect the wildlife interests in the absence of a formal EIS. It is thus unclear
whether the position taken in Sun Industries can be considered as precedent in
situations beyond the NPDES permitting process. Furthermore the discussion
in Sun Industries of the FWCA issue was dicta and not basic to the decision.
However, the Second Circuit's strong statement in Sun Industries concerning
the importance of the FWCA consultation process does represent a
recognition of the Act as a separate entity, worthy of independent compliance
under a congressionally-authorized mandate.
A separate rationale for compliance with the FWCA has emerged in the
recent case of National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus. 5° There, the plaintiff
organization sued to enjoin the construction of a twenty-three megawatt
33 u.s.c. § 1369 (1976).
532 F.2d 280, 290 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976).
4
' Section 662(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act specifically requires federal
agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and any state wildlife agency
"whenever the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed or authorized to be
impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream or other body of water otherwise
controlled or modified for any purpose whatever . . . . "(emphasis added).16 U.S.C. § 662(a)
(1976). The district court had found that EPA's NPDES permit constituted a potential stream
modification bringing EPA under the consultation requirements of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. 294 F. Supp. 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The granting of an NPDES permit might
not necessarily be found within the breadth of this statutory section.
4
" Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 137l(c)(1)(1976).
50
440F. Supp.1245 (D.D.C.1977).
46
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hydroelectric power plant to be built on the San Juan River in New Mexico.
They contended that the Department of the Interior had violated, inter alia,
section 662(b), 51 requiring the Secretary of Interior to submit to Congress a
report on the effect on wildlife of those projects upon which it has been
consulted. In granting the injunction, the district court found two purposes
behind section 662(b): the first being the requirement of federal agency
consideration of environment effects in project development and the second
being "to inform the Congress of those consequences to enable it to consider
conservation measures." 52
·
The court then addressed the issue of whether NEPA compliance also
constituted compliance with the FWCA. Although the EIS involved was
found to have been insufficient, the court noted that even if a legally adequate
environmental statement had been prepared, such action would not
necessarily serve the FWCA-mandated function of informing Congress of the
environmental effects of the federal projects it funds. "In such circumstances,
strict compliance with FWCA should be required."53 This conclusion
followed directly from the court's view that the Department of the Interior is
to serve as an indirect advisor to Congress providing expert information on
the wildlife impacts of federally-funded water resource projects.
In conclusion, the limited case law interpreting the FWCA does not
provide precise answers regarding the statute's application to the ever
increasing number of federal activities affecting American waterways. In the
past, the FWCA has been viewed as being superfluous when a judicially
acceptable environmental impact statement has been prepared. However, if
the Wildlife Federation and Sun Industries cases are indicative of the
emerging trend, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act will be viewed by
the federal courts as being procedurally and also substantively distinct from
NEPA. Future cases will develop the relationship between these two
statutes.

II.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES

Acr

OF

1973

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) 54 is a recent addition to the list of
specialized environmental review statutes. The key "consultation and
coordination" section of the Act is section 7. Section 7 states that:
The Secretary [of Interior] shall review other programs
administered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the
purposes of this Act. All other Federal departments and agencies
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act by
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species
and threatened species listed pursuant to Section 4 of this Act and by
16 u.s.c. § 662(b) (1976).
440 F. Supp. 1245, 1255 (D.D.C. 1977).
53 ld.
54 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976), as amended by Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978). The amendments are discussed in notes 90-101, supra, and
accompanying text.
51

52
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taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized,
funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or
result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with the affected states, to be critical.55
This section specifies four distinct obligations to be satisfied: (I) the Secretary
of Interior must review and utilize existing programs to further the purposes
of the Act; (2) all agencies must use their authority to further these same
purposes by carrying out conservation programs; (3) all agencies must insure
that their activities do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered
or threatened species; and (4) all agencies must insure that their actions do not
modify or destroy critical habitats for endangered species. These obligations
are set forth with relatively little detail thereby leaving major interpretive
questions for the courts. Broadly interpreted, this language creates a
substantive standard against which all federal agency activities would be
evaluated on judicial review.
The administration of this section of the law is divided between the
Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of Commerce. The
FWS is responsible for the application of section 7 to the vast majority of listed
endangered and threatened species while NMFS is responsible for a smaller
number of marine species. 56
Section 7 imposes a procedural consultation requirement on all federal
agencies whose activities may threaten listed endangered species and also
their critical habitats. The recently promulgated regulation, jointly issued by
the NMFS and the FWS, 57 as well as certain court decisions, 58 indicate that
section 7 cannot be satisfied through compliance with NEPA. It may be
possible for NEPA and Endangered Species Act procedure and documentation to be integrated to a limited extent. However, each statute has an
independent legal basis, and federal agencies must assure that their activities
meet the requirements of both.
The section 7 procedures may tum out to be among the most complex of
the specialized review requirements confronting federal agencies. The new
regulations put the burden squarely on the project agency to develop the
necessary biological information for an adequate review by the FWS or
55
56

57

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (emphasis added).
4.3 Fed. Reg. 870 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402).
43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978) (to be codi£ed in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(b) ). Section402.04(b)(1) states

that:
Consultation under section 7 may be consolidated with interagency cooperation required by other statutes, such as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. § 661
et seq.) or the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.). The satisfaction of the requirements of these other statutes, however, does not in itself relieve
a Federal agency of its obligation to comply with the consultation procedures set forth
in this part. (emphasis added).
5 ' T .V.A. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978); National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d359
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See generally text accompanying notes 67-69 and 7489, infra.

CLEVELANDSTATELAWREVIEW

206

[Vol. 27: 195

NMFS of the impact of the activity on an endangered or threatened species. 59
This data then serves as the basis for a biological opinion issued by FWS or
NMFS. The biological opinion must be rendered within 60 days after a
request for consultation from the sponsoring agency and the receipt of
adequate biological data. 60 The response period can be extended for an
additional60 days when additional information or further review is needed. 61
The procedure is further complicated in those instances when it must be
determined whether critical habitat is involved. 62 The eventual listing of up to
1700 species of endangered or threatened flora 63 will undoubtedly add to the
procedural problems and greatly increase the number of section 7
consultations required each year.
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act potentially may make a more
substantive impact on federal projects than NEPA. A brief review of the
emerging case law involving section 7 will illustrate a developing pattern of
judicial thought recognizing the significant procedural and substantive
requirements of the ESA.
Although the section 7 requirements were enacted into law in 1973, there
have been surprisingly few cases arising under its authority. In one such case,
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 64 the court was asked to enjoin an Army Corps of
Engineers dam project located in Meramec Park, Missouri, in part because it
was alleged that construction of the dam would jeopardize the continued
existence of the endangered Indiana bat. It was also claimed that the reservoir
built for the dam would flood the critical habitat of this variety of bat. The
Sierra Club maintained that the Corps ignored warnings from the
Department of the Interior about the impact of the dam on the Indiana bat
population. In rejecting the Sierra Club's position, the Eighth Circuit viewed
the mandate of section 7 to be mainly procedural and concluded that once a
project agency has consulted with the Department of Interior, it has satisfied
5"

43 Fed. Reg. 875 (1978) (to be cofdified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(c)). Section 402.04(c) states

that,
It is the primary responsibility of each Federal agency requesting consultation to
conduct the appropriate studies and to provide the biological information necessary for
an adequate review of the effect and identified activity or program has upon listed
species or their habitat. To the extent it is available, the Service will upon request
provide all relevant data and reports, personnel, and recommendations for additional
studies or surveys, but the Service is not obligated to fund any such additional studies or
surveys. (emphasis added).
60 43 Fed. Reg. 875-876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(e) (1)-(3)).
61 Fed. Reg. 876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(f)).
62 43 Fed. Reg. 876 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.05).
63 Currently, 177 species of fauna in the United States have been formally listed as endangered
and 37 species of fauna as threatened. Twenty species of flora have been listed as endangered and
two species as threatened. Thirty-three critical habitats have been designated. 41 Fed. Reg. 24523
(1976). The Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution is directed "to review (1) species of plants
which are now or may become endangered or threatened and (2) methods of adequately
conserving such species, and to report to Congress, within one year after December 28, 1973, the
results of such review including recommendations for new legislation or the amendment of
existing legislation." 16 U.S.C. § 1541 (1976). The Smithsonian Institution's report listed
approximately 3100 species of endangered or threatened plants. The report is printed in H.R.
REP. 94-51, 94th CoNe. 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CooE. CoNe. & Ao. NEws 439. It is
anticipated that many of these species will eventually be afforded the Act's protection.
64 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
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its obligation under the ESA. In terms of the substantive effect of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's expert opinion concerning the project's impact on
endangered species the court stated that, "Consultation under Section 7 does
not require acquiescence. . . . [T]he responsibility for [the project] decision
after consultation is . . . vested . . . in the agency involved."65 The Eighth
Circuit viewed the FWS's function as being strictly advisory with no veto
power over the actions of other federal agencies. At no point did the court
examine the specific obligations imposed by the Act in order to insure that
endangered species would not be jeopardized by agency action.
The result in the case can be explained possibly on the ground that the
continued existence of a sp~cies was not threatened by federal action; the
court noted that there are approximately 700,000 Indiana bats in existence and
that this Corps of Engineers project would affect the habitat of only about ten
thousand. 66 Also, the court had approved the environmental impact statement
prepared for the project and consequently the court may have believed that
the adequate EIS relieved the Corps of its obligation to consider any
environmental effect.
During the same year that Sierra Club v. Froehlke was decided, the Fifth
Circuit also ruled on a section 7 case, National Wildlife Federation v.
Coleman. 61 The Coleman case concerned the construction of a federallyassisted highway through a portion of the sole habitat of the Mississippi
sandhill crane an endangered bird species. At the time of the litigation only
forty sandhill cranes were known to exist. The district court had dismissed the
National Wildlife Federation's complaint based upon the section 7
allegations. 68 However, on appeal the Fifth Circuit gave section 7
requirements considerably more significance than had the Sixth Circuit in
Sierra Club v. Froehlke. It determined that there was a mandatory duty
imposed upon federal agencies to consult with the Department of Interior and
to insure that agency activities do not jeopardize endangered species.
Although the court recognized no project-stopping veto power granted the
Interior Department by the ESA, it did take a significant step to expand the
scope of analysis of section 7 consultation of judicial review. Judge Simpson
stated that the Department of Transportation had failed to properly consider
not only the direct but also the indirect effects of the highway's construction
on the sandhill crane. 69 This comprehensive project review would require the
sponsoring agency to evaluate secondary impacts in much the same way as
does an EIS. Implied from the court's holding is the substantive principle that
section 7 of the ESA mandates a broad-based endangered species impact
analysis in the planning of federal projects. In terms of practical effect, the
result of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that a project which lacks this wideranging analysis may not proceed. In the Coleman decision, the highway
construction was enjoined until the Department of Interior determined that

6

'

66

67
6
6

'
"

lei. at 1303.
Id.
529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
529 F.2d 359, 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).

208

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:195

project modifications brought the activity within compliance of section 7
requirements. By reaching this result, the court effectively gave the
Department of Interior limited authority to regulate federal aid highways.
Not all of the cases have involved the use of provisions of the Endangered
Species Act to halt federal developmental projects. In Defenders of Wildlife
v. Andrus70 a district court had an opportunity to review the regulations of the
Fish and Wildlife Service with regard to the sport hunting of migratory birds.
The plaintiffs alleged that since the regulations permitted hunting before
sunrise and after dark, endangered bird species would be inadvertently killed
because hunters could not distinguish between them and other birds during
those periods. In striking down the regulations as being arbitrary and
unlawful, the court rejected the contention of the Fish and Wildlife Service
that its duty under the ESA was solely to avoid jeopardizing the continued
existence of protected species. However, the court ruled that the FWS had an
"affirmative duty to increase the population of protected species."71 This duty
included the use of all methods necessary to increase the numbers of
endangered species so that they will no longer be in that category.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus may present an unusual case since the
programs and regulations of the Secretary of Interior are involved and not a
project-oriented, developmental agency. Under section 7 of the ESA, the
Secretary is directed to review the programs under his authority and "utilize
such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this Act."72 It could be argued
that this same standard should be the mandate of every federal agency and
hence the affirmative duties identified by the district court would be generally
applicable. At any rate, it is worth noting the expansive substantive
interpretation given the statute by this court and consider it part of an
emerging trend in the law.
This trend is also represented in the recent decision of Connor v. Andrus. 73
There a plaintiff successfully challenged Fish and Wildlife Service and State
of Texas migratory waterfowl regulations on substa'ltive administrative law
grounds. The agency rules prohibiting the hunting of the endangered Mexican
duck in designated portions of New Mexico, Texas and Arizona were struck
down as being arbitrary and capricious. The district court determined that the
federal and state hunting ban would not serve to increase the population of the
endangered species. The court's surprising conclusion stemmed from its
determination that the hunting ban would indirectly aid in the destruction of
the critical habitat of the endangered duck species. The court concluded that
designated "no-hunting" lands would now be put to a more intensive land use
since they could no longer be reserved for duck hunting. The ultimate result of
this land use shift, the court felt, would be to eliminate necessary habitat for
the Mexican duck and thus further reduce the size of species populations.
Therefore in order to protect the habitat of the duck, Judge Wood enjoined
the Fish and Wildlife Service's regulations thereby permitting the endangered
species to be hunted in three states.
'

0

71

72
73

428 F.Supp. 167 (D. D.C. 1977).
Id. at 170.
16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1976).
Civil Action No. EP-77 CA-187 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
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This decision is unsettling for a number of reasons. First, it places the
burden of proof upon the federal agency acting to protect an endangered
species. Here, the district court did not defer to or acknowledge any agency
expertise in the endangered species field. The court, using as its sole basis
information gathered at a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, invalidated a regulation which had been formally proposed,
redrafted, and finally issued as a formal agency regulation. To find these
regulations as having "no rational basis" would seemingly require a more
broadly based factual determination. Second, the court enjoined the agency
rules without discussing the traditional tests for injunctive relief. It is difficult
to imagine just how the plaintiffs could have satisfied the requisite showings of
irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits and a furthering of the
public interest in order to justify the award of the injunction. And third, this
decision may encourage other individuals and organizations to challenge
protective regulations in local federal districts. However, taking the Connor
v. Andrus decision at face value, it ironically supports the evolving philosophy
that in ESA cases federal agencies must exercise their responsibilities in a
manner that minimizes the total adverse effects upon endangered species,
both direct and indirect.
The most recent case considering the Endangered Species Act, TV A v.
Hill, 74 is also the most well-known. A brief factual discussion of the case is
necessary. Every year since 1967 Congress had authorized funds for the
construction of the Tellico dam located on the Tennessee River. In 1968
construction was commenced on the $100 million structure which would
flood 16,500 acres if completed. 75 After litigation over the adequacy of the
environmental impact statement had been concluded/ 6 a University of
Tennessee ichthyologist, Dr. David A. Etnier, discovered the existence of a
small fish he named the snail darter. He determined that the segment of the
Little Tennessee River that was to be impounded was the sole habitat of the
species. 77 On December 28, 1973 the Endangered Species Act was enacted
with the result that on November 10, 1975 the snail darter had been listed by
the Department of the Interior as an endangered species78 and in April of 1976
the river segment in which the fish is found was formally designated a critical
habitat. 79
Although suit was filed to enjoin completion of the project in February of
1976, 80 the trial court agreed with the Department of the Interior in
concluding that completion of the dam would probably result in the complete
destruction of the snail darter species; it refused to grant the permanent
injunction sought by the plaintiffs. The court believed that the continuation of
funding for the project indicated a congressional interpretation that the ESA
74

98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
549 F.2d 1064, 1067 (6th Cir. 1977).
76
See, Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund v. TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
77
549 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1977).
"40 Fed. Reg. 47505-06 (1975), codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1977).
79
41 Fed. Reg. 13926-28 (1976), codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (1977).
80
419 F. Supp. 753 (E. D. Tenn. 1976).
75

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

210

[Vo1.27:195.

did not bar completion of the dam. The cost of the dam, the degree of
completion and the fact that the court believed that the project could not be
modified to mitigate the effect upon the snail darter undoubtedly account for
the decision. As if to confirm the district court's decision, Congress soon
appropriated $9 million for continuing work on the Tellico project. 81
On appeal, 82 the Sixth Circuit took a position diametrically opposed to the
lower court. In a strongly-worded opinion written by Judge Celebrezze, the
court found that the TV A dam project had violated section 7 of the Act and
consequently it permanently enjoined further construction. In reversing the
district court, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the ESA did not provide
the Secretary of Interior with veto power over the activities of other federal
agencies. However, the court did find a duty to satisfy "compliance
standards" set by Interior which could then be considered upon judicial
review.
Of greater significance was the court's resolution of the "on-going project"
issue. The threshold question was whether the ESA applied to such a project
initiated prior to the enactment of the statute. In unequivocal terms the court
stated that the Act did apply to on-going projects, reasoning that detrimental
impacts upon endangered species may not be apparent prior to construction.
The degree to which the project was completed was not influential in the Sixth
Circuit's opinion; it viewed the possible destruction of a species as the decisive
factor. "[W]hether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating
the social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique
form of life."83 Consequently, the court issued a permanent injunction. 84
Undaunted, the appropriation committees of both Houses of Congress
sponsored legislation, which was ultimately enacted, which continued
funding for the Tellico project. 85
Finally in 1978 the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
concerning the snail darter controversy and resoundingly supported the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of the ESA. 86 The Court found the language of section
7 to be unambiguous and concluded that the operation of the Tellico dam
violated both the spirit and the wording of the Act. Of great importance to the
Court's decision was the fact that the issue of the impact of the dam upon the
snail darter had been conclusively resolved both by the TV A's prior
admissions and by the uncontroverted findings of the Secretary of Interior. 87
Consequently Chief Justice Burger addressed a large portion of the majority
opinion to the question of whether the TV A, under the particular facts of the
case, would be in violation of the ESA. After reviewing the development of
81

Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations
Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889 (1976).
82 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
83
ld. atl07l.
84 ld. at 1075. Judge Celebrezze added that, "[T]his injunction shall remain in effect until
Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the Act or the snail
darter has been deleted from the list of endangered species or its critical habitat materially
redefined." ld.
85
Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797 (1978).
86
98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978).
87
I d. at 2290.
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federal endangered species legislation the Court determined that the 1973 Act
"represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation." 88 The TVA's argument
founded upon legislative intent not to subject this major, on-going project to
the rigors of the ESA was rejected out of hand by the Court. Under the
provisions of the Act, species extinction was to be avoided "whatever the
cost" and endangered species were to be accorded "priority over the 'primary
missions' of federal agencies." 89 Viewing this policy decision as clearly within
the province of the Congress, the Court found no legislative or statutory
authority vested in the judiciary to override the congressional decision. The
broad interpretation given the ESA is well worth noting for application to
future cases challenging federal actions.
The major idea to be taken from the TVA v. Hill decision is that the
Endangered Species Act imposes upon all federal agencies both a
consultation requirement and a substantive decision-making standard upon
which courts can evaluate agency compliance. In addition, when the facts
clearly indicate that a federal action will completely extinguish an
endangered life form or critical habitat, the judiciary has very little choice but
to enjoin the activity. The Court's decision necessarily did not address the
more difficult factual situations where species or habitat impact is unclear or
debatable. In these instances the agency's decisions should be evaluated in
light of the policy embodied in the ESA. Future cases will undoubtedly
develop the law concerning (1) the question of when agencies must take
protective actions with respect to endangered species and (2) what level of
proof is necessary to establish an agency obligation to act.
Congressional reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill was
quick. Congress passed the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978
within four months of the Supreme Court's decision. 90 This addition to the Act
contained a variety of separate provisions but it specifically addressed the
Tellico dam controversy. 91 Under a general exemption procedure, 92 the
88

Id. at 2292.
Id. at 2297. The majority also disposed of the TV A's second line of defense that the ESA
should not be applied retroactively to affect an on-going federal project. The Court ruled that the
section 7 requirements must be met when there remains any project activities which must yet be
"authorized, funded, or carried out." 98 S. Ct. at 2299. Furthermore the TV A argument that
continuing appropriations for the Tellico project represented a limited implied repeal of the ESA
was solidly rejected. The most that the Court was willing to accept was that the congressional
committees did not think that the ESA was applicable to the Tellico dam project. Standing alone,
the Court felt that this did not constitute a statutory repeal. This portion of the Supreme Court's
decision is especially noteworthy since it virtually eliminates one possible defense to future ESA
actions - that of retroactivity.
90
Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U .S.C. § 1531).
91
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 5(i)(1), 92 Stat. 3761 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539). In
addition, this immediate exemption provision also applies to the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir
on the Laramie River in Wyoming. See [1978 Current Developments] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1129
and [1978 Current Developments) ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1379.
92
Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752-60 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7)(e)-(p) ).
Two other exemption procedures are authorized by the Act. First, if the Secretary of Defense
"finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security" the Endangered Species
Committee must grant the exemption "for any agency action." Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat.
3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(i)). This exceedingly broad power caused
President Carter to mention in his bill signing statement that, "I am asking . . . that the exercise
of possible national security exemption by the Secretary of Defense be undertaken only in grave
89
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amendments direct the newly-created Endangered Species Committee93 to
decide whether or not the Tellico project should receive an exemption. The
Committee must find that (1) there are no "reasonable and prudent"
alternatives to dam completion, 94 (2) that the benefits of completion "clearly
outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with
conserving the species or its critical habitat,"95 and (3) that such action is "in
the public interest."96
Although the 1978 amendments to the Endangered Species Act will
dictate the future of the Tellico project they also have a broad impact beyond
the scope of the problem presented by the Tennessee dam. First, they reaffirm
the obligation of federal agencies to insure that their actions do not jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.
Also, these agencies must protect against the "destruction or adverse
modification" 97 of critical habitat. The duty to consult with the Department of
Interior on matters involving endangered species is unavoidable. Second, by
adding a general exemption procedure98 to be administered by the Committee, Congress has insured that many "development/wildlife" controversies will be decided before an administrative rather than judicial forum. 99 This
system along with the new consciousness of endangered species matters
circumstances posing a clear and immediate threat to national security." (emphasis added) 14
CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2002 (Nov. 13, 1978). Second, the President is authorized to grant
exemptions "for the repair and replacement of a public facility" in any area declared to be a major
disaster area under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat. 3759 (1978) (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7}(p)).
93 Pub. L. No. 95-632, §3,92Stat.3753(1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7)(e)). This
committee is composed of seven members including six governmental officials (the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Army, Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors) and one selected from nominees recommended by state governors.
94 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(h)(1)(A)
(i)). This standard also appears in section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act at 49
U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). That provision prohibits "the use of any publicly owned land from a
public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local
significance . . . or any land from an historic site. . . ."
95 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3758 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536
(7)(h)( 1)(A)(ii)).
96
Id. The term "public interest" is undefined in the Act.
97 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat.3752 (1978) (to becodifiedat16U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(a)). The
language employed in amending this part of the section 7 standard is new and expands the
protective coverage for critical habitat. Both the "destruction" and the "adverse modification" of
critical habitat are now prohibited by section 7(a). The latter objective- prohibiting adverse
modifications - may be the most important change in the coverage of this section and will focus
future litigation on the question of what constitutes an adverse modification of habitat.
98 See note 3 supra. The procedure allows a "federal agency, the Governor of the State in
which an agency action will occur, if any, or a permit or license applicant" to apply for the
exemption. Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3755 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)
(g)(l)).
99 This does not mean that judicial review of the exemption procedure is prohibited. A
decision by the three member review board created pursuant to Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat.
3752 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(g)(3)(A)) that an irresolvable conflict does not
exist or that the exemption applicant has not met the requirement necessary for exemption would
be reviewable in federal district court. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92Stat. 3756 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(g)(5)). On the other hand, any final decision of the cabinet-level
Endangered Species Committee is reviewable in United States Courts of Appeal as long as the
petition for review is filed within ninety days of the Committee's decision. Pub!. L. No. 95-632, § 3,
92 Stat. 3756 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U .S.C.§ 1536 (7)(n) ). Although not specifically stated, this
appears to create an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to review Committee determinations.
WEEKLY

1978]

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

213

fostered by the Hill case and the 1978 amendments could serve to dissuade
federal agencies from undertaking harmful projects since they would be
reviewed by the Department of the Interior. Third, Congress has not found
that compliance with NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement
satisfies either the substantive or procedural mandate of the amended
Endangered Species Act. Although one section of the new law authorizes a
coordination of the ESA biological assessment with the NEPA process, 100 no
comprehensive integration of the two statutes has been attempted. It seems
apparent that Congress intended to preserve the independent function of the
Endangered Species Act apart from any presidential effort to "streamline"
federal environmental review activities. 101
The developed case law discussed above must be viewed as a logical
precursor to the 1978 amendments. These decisions emphasized the
importance of the Endangered Species Act and the need for federal agencies
to be sensitive to ESA considerations in project planning and permit granting.
Now agencies must be concerned about the adverse effects of their actions
upon endangered or threatened species whether or not NEPA analysis has
been undertaken. The future will disclose whether the administrative system
provided by the recent amendment will permit a careful review and
resolution of agency conflicts while also preserving endangered species of
plants and animals.

III.

NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION

ACT

The environmental movement of the late 1960's led to the enactment of
NEPA in 1969 and greatly influenced the passage of a broad range of special
environmental laws and executive orders. It also generated a new interest in
older laws which previously had little or no effect on federal programs. These
laws have recently regained vitality due to legislative amendments and new
judicial interpretations. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
(NHPA) 102 is a prime example of this development and in terms of federal
programs, potentially one of the most important.
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 established the National
Register of Historic Places. 103 The Act also required federal agencies to
consult with the newly-created Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
whenever federal projects could have adverse impacts on historic or
100 Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3753 (1978) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (7)(c)). In
addition, this coordination is merely suggested and not made mandatory by the Act.
101 See, Executive Order 11991, 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 808 (May 24, 1977). This
order directed the Council on Environmental Quality to issue formal regulations to control
agencies' NEPA compliance activities. In announcing the executive order, President Carter
stressed his intention to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data.
If the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 are indicators of the congressional
prospensity to enact specialized environmental review statutes with unique procedural
requirements, then the total integration of all environmental review in the EIS will not be
possible.
102 Pub. L. No. 89-665,80 Stat. 915 (1966) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §470 (1976)). TheActhas been
amended several times. See, Pub. L. No. 91-383, 84 Stat. 825 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-458,90 Stat.
1939 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313 (1976).
103
16 U .S.C. § 470(a) (1976).
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archaeological sites. 104 Executive Order 11593, 105 issued in 1971, was
interpreted by the Advisory Council to expand the authority of the 1966 Act to
include properties eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic
Places. This order provided protection equal to those properties actually
listed on the Register. In 1976, the National Historic Preservation Act was
amended to formally extend the protections of the Act to such eligible
properties, 106 and thus the statutory authority was brought in line with the
existing Executive Order. Additional legislative and administrative action in
the "preservation area" can be expected. 107
The full impact of the Act and Executive Order began to be felt after the
Advisory Council issued regulations for carrying out the Act and the Order in
early 1974. 108 In short, the Advisory Council procedures required that a
federal agency consult a State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) when
determining how its activities will affect historic or archaeological sites. 109
The procedures also require that the SHPO, along with the Advisory Council
and the interested federal agency, reach written agreement in certain cases on
how to mitigate any adverse effects expected from a federal project. no The
Advisory Council procedures also contain minimum review periods which
can cause delays for various federal projects. For instance, the Advisory
Council may take 30 days to review a "no adverse effect" determination made
by a federal agency.lll This review follows the required survey activities,
consultations with the SHPO, and possibly a determination of eligibility for
104

16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976). This sub-section would seem to apply to both detrimental and
beneficial effects of federal actions.
105
Executive Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U .S.C. § 470 at 429
(1976).
106
Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1320 (1976).
107
In his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress President Carter proposed the
creation of a National Heritage Trust to "preserve places that have special natural, historical,
cultural, and scientific value." 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 782,783 (May30, 1977). Although
various programs for implementing the Trust concept are still being debated and additional
authorizing legislation from Congress will be needed, it is reasonably certain that the President's
proposal will be carried forward at least in part. Already the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and
the Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation of the National Park Service have been
merged together into a new Department of the Interior sub-agency called the Heritage
Conservation and Recreation Service. 43 Fed. Reg. 7482 (1978). Proposals for future Trust
programs include a review and consultation procedure for both natural and cultural resources
similar to that imposed currently by the Advisory Council procedures on federal activities
affecting historic or archaeological properties.
Other federal authorities can be expected to impose additional cultural resource protection
responsibilities onto federal projects and programs. For instance, the Archeological and Historic
Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 469a-1 (1976) establishes the requirement that federal
activities be conducted so as to avoid irreparable harm to archaeologically significant properties.
The Act also provides a series of funding mechanisms for conducting salvage work for
archaeological properties adversely affected by federal projects.
10 " 36 C.F.R. pt. BOO (1977). On October 25, 1978 the Advisory Council proposed extensive
amendments to the pt. 800 regulations. See, 43 Fed. Reg. 50650-660, (1978). These modifications
were intended to simplify Advisory Council commenting procedures and streamline the entire
process. On January 30, 1979 the Advisory Council issued its final regulations which modified the
previous proposal. See 44 Fed. Reg. 6068-6081 (1979).
109

44 Fed. Reg. 6074-75, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§800. 4(a)-(b)), 800.5. Strict time limits
are imposed upon the SHPO and if no response to a request for his opinion is received within 30
days, concurrence is presumed. 44 Fed. Reg. 6075, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)-(b).
0
"
44 Fed. Reg. 6076, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c).
"' Under the final regulations, this period has been reduced from theprior45 days to30days.
See, 44 Fed. Reg. 6075, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(a).
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the National Register of Historic Places made by the Heritage Conservation
and Recreation Service. 112
The National Historic Preservation Act and Advisory Council procedures
have placed a significant additional obligation on federal agencies. By itself,
NEPA requires that agencies evaluate the impacts of their activities on
cultural as well as natural and ecological resources. 113 The NHPA, as
implemented through the Advisory Council procedures, often requires
additional investigations and documentation for cultural resource impacts
beyond those required by NEPA. 114 These additional requirements may be
particularly onerous from the agency's viewpoint when archaeological
properties are involved. Archaeological properties eligible for the National
Register are found in many areas of the country and their presence and the
precise location usually cannot be detected without extensive field surveys
often involving subsurface excavation. These research requirements, when
combined with the Advisory Council's review procedures, could cause
federal project agencies substantial expense and delay.
During the period immediately following its enactment in 1966, the NHP A
was the focus of only a small amount of litigation, most of which did not
progress beyond the federal district court level of review. Of these cases, most
concerned NEPA violation charges, but they also involved direct judicial
consideration of the Historic Preservation Act. These cases identify the
requirements of section 106 of the NHPA (Section 470f of Title 16) as separate
and apart from the NEPA statute. Section 470f requires federal agencies
"having direct or indirect jurisdiction" over a federally-assisted or licensed
activity to "take into account" the impact of the activity upon historic
properties that are included or eligible for inclusion on the National
Register.' 15 In addition, the federal agency must permit the Advis~ry Council
112
Eligibility for listing is determined in conjunction with the standards established in 36
C.F.R. § 63 (1977) and 44 Fed. Reg. 6074 to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a) (3).
113
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (4) (1976). This section states that one element of national policy will be
to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage and
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice."
114
Newly-proposed amendments to the Advisory Council's regulations address the question
of NEPA compliance. 44 Fed. Reg. 6078, 6079 (1979). These new regulations suggest that
agencies should coordinate their NEP A and NHPA review processes, although at the same time
flatly stating that the two statutes are "independent." The newly-issued Council on Environmental Quality regulations concerning federal EIS preparation direct that NEPA compliance should
be combined with other statutory requirements "to the fullest extent possible." 43 Fed. Reg. 55997
(1978), to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25. In its statement of policy the proposed NEPA
regulations direct federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" to "integrate the requirements
of NEPA with other planning and environmental review procedures required by law or by
agency practice so that all such procedures run concurrently rather than consecutively." 43 Fed.
Reg. 55991 (1978) to be codif\ed at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(c). Although the language employed seems
more fitting in the criminal law context, the intention is clearly to streamline all federal
environmental review.
115
Section 106, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976) provides as follows:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed
Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal
department or independent agency having authority to license any undertaking shall,
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior
to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the
undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or
eligible for inclusion in the Nationa!Register. The headofany such Federal agency shall
afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation established under sections 470i to
470n of this title a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking.
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to comment on the proposal.ll 6 A brief review of the key NHPA cases will
illustrate the expanding scope of federal actions subject to section 470f and the
emerging substantive interpretation given to the Act.
The breadth of federal action subject to the requirements of the NHPA is
illustrated by the case of Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee. 117 There, plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the relocation of a bank regulated by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation until the FDIC (1) prepared an environmental impact
statement and (2) consulted with the Advisory Council. The First Dundee
Bank had requested permission from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) to relocate its operations then quartered in a structure
located in an historic area of Dundee, Illinois; the bank wished to demolish the
building after the move.
The district court found that since the FDIC' s permission was required in
order for the bank to relocate, the FDIC had "authority to license" the
relocation pursuant to section 106 of the NHPA, and therefore was required to
follow the section 106 procedures. The court enjoined the relocation and
demolition pending compliance by the FDIC with NEPA and NHPA. The
effect of the decision is to give the federal courts power to enjoin "non-federal
entities from performing activities in contravention" of agency responsibility
to prevent those activities.ll 8 Furthermore, Edwards exemplifies the
application of environmental review requirements to federal regulatory
actions as opposed to the directly developmental activities.
An important early decision interpreting the NHPA was Ely v. Velde. 119
The case involved a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)l 20 to the State of Virginia for the purpose of constructing a
medical and reception center for Virginia prison inmates in the Green Springs
area of Louisa County. Plaintiffs claimed that the LEAA should have filed an
environmental impact statement on this grant and in addition claimed that the
LEAA had violated section 470f of the NHPA by failing to take into account
the effect of this proposed center on three nearby homes listed in theN ational
Register of Historic Places. The federal government claimed that the LEAA
was without authority to impose any conditions on grants it would make
under the Safe Streets Act. 121 The court found, however, that the LEAA was
obliged to comply with the procedural requirements of both NEPA and the
NHPA. It determined that it was not the congressional intent to exempt
activities under the Safe Streets Act from the command of other federal
statutes.
Ely is significant because there, the NHPA was applied to a situation where the federal activity would not directly involve a property on
the Historic Register but rather would have a secondary effect on such a
property. Such an effect analysis could be a valuable tool for environmental
litigants in situations where an agency's activities do not have a direct impact
lis Id.

393 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
Id. at 682.
119 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
120 The LEAA is empowered to make grants to state planning agencies pursuant to 16 U .S.C.§
3733 (1976).
12 1 42 U .S.C. § 3701 {1976).
117

118
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on an historic property but rather have a secondary impact which would
damage or in some other way adversely affect an historic property indirectly.122 The case also indicates that the courts consider the NHPA applicable
to all federal agencies regardless of their enabling authority of responsibilities.
Prior to the 1976 amendment to the FHPA, a number of cases had raised
the issue of determining the time when the section 470f requirements apply to
federal activities. 123 These cases all concluded that the language of the statute
applying to federal actions that affect any "district, site, building, structure, or
object that is included in the National Register" 124 was not intended to
encompass projects that had been approved before the property in question
had been included in the National Register. The effect of these decisions,
which arose largely from situations involving urban renewal demolition
grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was
to exempt any future demolition or construction from review by the Advisory
Council once federal monies had been spent for planning of an urban renewal
project. This was true even if the HUD-funded project had only progressed to
the preliminary stages. 125
The recent legislative amendment to the National Historic Preservation
Act 126 was intended to preclude these results from occurring again. The
inquiry must now focus upon the question of whether or not the proposed
activity will affect a property" eligible for inclusion" on the National Register.
Section 470f now states that the
head of any federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over
a proposed federal or federally assisted undertaking . . . shall,
prior to the approval of the expenditure of any federal funds . . .
take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site,

----

122 The case of Petterson v. Froehlke, 354 F. Supp. 45 (D. Ore. 1972) also lends support to this
view. There, the district court considered a suit involving the federally-funded expansion of the
Portland Airport. Plaintiffs were citizens from the State of Washington who had challenged an
Army Corps of Engineers' dredge and fill permit which had been granted for the filling of 640
acres of the Columbia River. Plaintiffs alleged that the expansion of the Portland Airport would
affect the Fort Vancouver National Historic Site which was more than ten miles from the airport.
They alleged that the Army Corps of Engineers' permit and the airport expansion would create
increased auto traffic and consequently more air pollution. The court concluded that the Corp of
Engineers' dredge and fill permit came within the protections of FHPA, but it felt that on the facts
the alleged impacts of the permitting action were too attenuated to require compliance with the
mandate of section 470f.
In contrast to Velde and Froehlke is Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations v.
Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1977). At issue there was the contention that the Urban
Mass Transit Administration had failed to properly take "into account" the impact of the tunnel
upon several railroad structures listed on the National Register of Historic Places when it funded a
1.7 mile commuter rail tunnel. The district court found no violation and unfortunately failed to
address plaintiffs' specific contention that UMT A had not considered the secondary or indirect
impact of the tunnel upon the listed structures.
123
See, e.g., St. Joseph Historical Soc'y. v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of St.
Joseph, Mo., 366 F. Supp. 605 (W.O. Mo.1973); South Hill NeighborhoodAss'n. v. Romney,421
F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
124
16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970) (amended 1976).
125 Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
126 Pub. L. No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1320 (1976). The legislative history behind this amendment is
almost void of any direct comment. This provision was part of a multi-purpose amendment to the
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965. See [1976) U.S. CooE CoNe. & Ao. NEws 2442,
2461.
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building, structure or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. (emphasis added) 127
One recent case, however, Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 128
ignores this recent legislative amendment. In Hart, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had given a grant to the Denver
Urban Renewal Authority (DURA) for an urban renewal project. Part of this
project involved the renovation of the Daniels and Fisher Tower in Denver,
Colorado. DURA had proposed to sell the Tower to a private developer. The
Colorado State Historical Society and the State Historic Preservation Officer
jointly sued the City of Denver and HUD to enjoin the sale of the building to
this private developer. The district court granted the injunction until HUD
had complied with its own regulations which had been drafted to satisfy the
Advisory Council procedures.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that section 470£ of the NHP A was
inapplicable since the approval of the expenditure of federal funds occurred
prior to the inclusion of the Tower on the National Register. The project loan
and capital grant contract was approved on March 7, 1968, while the Tower
was listed on the National Register on December 2, 1969. The redevelopment
authority had purchased the Daniels and Fisher Tower and offered it for sale
on April16, 1970. No buyers had been found for five years. But on April16,
1975, the sale to the private purchasers was negotiated. The Tenth Circuit was
clearly opposed to requiring HUD to solicit comments from the Advisory
Council concerning DURA's agreement to sell the Tower. Not only did the
court refuse to give retroactive application to the 1976 amendment, it failed
even to mention it in the opinion. The court probably thought that since the
HUD funds which were used to acquire these properties had already been
expended, HUD had very little control over the actual disposition of the
Daniels and Fisher Tower areas and consequently, requirements to comply
with the Advisory Council procedures would have been a futile exercise.
The Hart case raises interesting questions involving federal support of
long-term planning in redevelopment programs. When the federal government makes a grant for these purposes, it may not have a precise knowledge
of what form the redevelopment will take in the future. Since section 470f is
prospective in application, in that it applies to situations arising prior to the
actual expenditure of federal funds, at the early stages of project planning, it
would seem incumbent upon the federal agencies to determine to the
maximum extent possible whether their present or future activities will affect
historic properties that are either currently listed or eligible for inclusion on
the National Register. If this is the case, then compliance with the Advisory
Council procedures should be undertaken.
A more perplexing problem suggested by the Hart case involves a
situation where federal funds are granted to state or local entities for a variety
of purposes and projects. As the connection between the federal granting
agency and the ultimate acting agency becomes more attenuated, it would
seem Hs though the federal agency would find it more difficult to comply with
the command of section 470f. A federal agency having a continuing
127
128

16 u.s.c. § 470f (1976).
551 F.2d 1178 (lOth Cir. 1977).
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relationship with a state or local grantee can, if it wishes, exert influence over
the actions of that grantee.
A pair of cases involving federal support of transportation construction
projects underlines the emerging importance of the NHPA in developing
litigation. In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Adams, 129 the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the completion of 1-66 in the Virginia suburbs of the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. After rejecting a number of procedural
and substantive challenges to the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
EIS, Chief Judge Haynsworth examined the allegation that DOT had failed to
comply with the NHPA and the Advisory Council's regulations. The
substance of the claim was that the highway project would affect listed
historic properties in the District of Columbia and that the Secretary of
Transportation had not "taken into account" these impacts when he made his
decision to fund the roadway segment. The Fourth Circuit accepted the
district court's and DOT's conclusion that 1-66 would not adversely affect
historic properties in the District of Columbia. By so doing the court
approved a federal action that had bypassed the specific consultation
requirements of the NHPA by a unilateral decision of the sponsoring agency.
Chief Judge Haynsworth believed that merely by making the EIS available to
the Advisory Council, DOT complied with the NHP A even though this
participation falls far short of that required by statute and existing regulation.
The decision is unfortunate since it authorizes a federal agency to make the
threshold determination of the scope of impact of its projects independent of
the advice of either the Advisory Council or the State Historic Preservation
Officer. Such a result ignores the clear intent of the NHPA and is contrary to a
policy of inter-agency consultation to encourage sound planning and
developmental decisions.
A more enlightened view is to be found in Hall County Historical Society
v. Georgia Department of Transportation. 130 This case involved a comprehensive legal attack intended to enjoin the construction on a .877 mile
highway project in Gainesville, Georgia known as the "Green Street
Extension." The federal Department of Transportation, through the Federal
Highway Administration (FHA), had determined in 1972 that the project did
not merit the preparation of an EIS alleging that it would not significantly
affect the quality of the human environment. Although the project was later
slightly modified, no EIS was prepared and construction commenced in
September of 1977. In August of 1975 the Green Street Historical District had
been formally listed on the National Register of Historic Places.
After addressing other claims of the plaintiff, 131 the district court
129

130

571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978).
447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).

131 One issue in the case worthy of mention was plaintiff's contention that DOT had violated
section 4(f) of the Transportation Act, which prohibits the "use of . . . any land from an historic
site of national, State, or local significance" unless there is no "feasible and prudent" alternative. 49
U.S.C. § 1653(f)(l970). Although on the facts of the case the court found no such use of the land
either directly or indirectly, future litigants may find section 4(f) a powerful tool and a companion
to section 470f of the NHPA if they can prove that the constructive use or indirect impact of the
proposed highway project will ultimately harm the historic structures. The use of evidence
predicting the economic decline of the area should not be considered irrelevant to that
determination.
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considered the contention that the FHA had violated section 470 of the
NHPA. In strong language, Judge O'Kelley castigated the FHA for its
"improper delegation" of federal responsibilities under the NHPA and the
regulations promulgated under its authority. An injunction was granted for
construction of the extension project pending the FHA's compliance with the
National Historic Preservation Act. The court described a fact pattern
wherein the FHA had totally relied upon the Georgia DOT's and the State Historic Preservation Officers' determination that the highway project would
have no effect upon the Green Street Historic District. This "blind reliance"
upon a state agency's decision is reminiscent of earlier case law invalidating
state authored negative declaration decisions in the NEPA-EIS context. 132
Hall County Historical Society demonstrates that the NHPA requirements are
federal agency obligations upon which independent federal analysis must be
made. The decision is important since it precludes a federal agency making
developmental grants from abdicating its substantive statutory responsibility
through this form of delegation. Whether this principle will be extended to
other federal grant programs remains to be seen; however, it does represent a
movement towards strict compliance with both the procedural elements of
the historic preservation law and a substantive standard for agency decisionmaking.
In conclusion, it is apparent that the NHPA section 470f requirements
remain as independent obligations of federal agencies apart from the impact
statement mandated by NEPA. Although there is some administrative effort
being made to integrate the consultation requirement within the NEPA
process, 133 it would seem that inclusion of historic preservation effects in an
132
The question of the delegation of federal environmental review responsibilities to nonfederal parties has arisen previously in the context of the NEPA impact statement. See generally,
RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 778-83 and cases cited therein. In the NEPA situation, the issue
concerns whether or not a non-federal agency may independently prepare the project EIS when
NEPA specifically requires the federal agency to undertake the review. The NEPA delegation
issue has been heavily litigated and in two instances has resulted in legislative changes which
permit EIS delegation in limited circumstances. See, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (1975),
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (0) (1976) (federal-aid highway program) and Pub. L. No. 93-383,88
Stat. 638 (1974), codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304 (h) (1976) (HUD delegation for certain
Community Development Block Grant activities). Whether Congress will permit nonfederal
agencies to comply with the NHPA or other environmental review statutes remains to be seen.
133
The proposed CEQ regulations governing the preparation of environmental impact
statements specifically identifies the National Historic Preservation Act as an .. environment
review law" which can be integrated with NEPA. 43 Fed. Reg. 55997 (1978) (to becodifiedat40
C.F.R. § 1502.25) of the proposal states that:
To the fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental impact
statements concurrently with and integrated with environmental impact analyses and
related surveys and studies required by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act . . . the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 . . . the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 . . . and other environmental review laws.
Whether this section will have any impact on existing agency procedures is problematic.
134
It remains to be seen whether the federal courts will develop a substantive standard of
agency decisionmaking based upon a presumption favoring the protection of historic structures
and areas. Although section 470f only requires that agencies .. take into account" project impacts
upon historic properties, a combination of the policies behind the Act and the section 470f
responsibilities could be fashioned into a substantive standard. The United States Supreme Court
has recently ruled in favor of a local historic preservation ordinance regulating the modification of
historic structures in New York City. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646
(1978).
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EIS will not legally satisfy the specific language of section 470f. 134 For the time
being, federal agencies planning to take actions which might adversely affect
historic properties should closely adhere to the Advisory Council procedures.
Procedural compliance in this area is of great importance. Future cases will
undoubtedly determine precisely when a federal activity or license "affects"
historic properties and also what level of substantive compliance with the
Advisory Council's procedures is necessary. Until then, the handful of
decided cases indicate that the NHP A presents all federal agencies with
responsibilities that cannot be ignored.

IV.

WILD

ANn

SCENIC RIVERS

Acr

The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) 135 was originally enacted in 1968,
and has been subsequently amended several times. 136 The statute is jointly
administered by the Secretary of Interior through the Heritage Conservation
and Recreation Service and, when national forest lands are involved, by the
Secretary of Agriculture through the National Forest Service. Section l(b) of
the Act states the basic objective of the statute that:
certain selected rivers of the nation which, with their immediate
environments, possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural or other similar
values, shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they
and their immediate environments shall be protected for the
benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations. 137
Section 2 of the Act effectuates this purpose by establishing "a national wild
and scenic river system" and methods for inclusion of wild, scenic or
recreational rivers therein. 138 It also defines criteria for eligibility for inclusion
under each of the three classifications included under the law: wild, scenic,
and recreational. 139 The Wild and Scenic Rivers system presently includes
1600 miles of river. 14°Fifty-one river segments are currently being considered
for inclusion in the system. 14I
In section 7 (a), the Act limits the activities of federal agencies with respect
to rivers included in the system. 142 This section provides in part that "no
department or agency of the United States shall assist by name, grant, license,
135 Pub. L. No. 90-542,82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1976)). The legislative
history supporting the 1968 Wild andScenicRiversActcan be found in [1968] U.S. CovE CoNe. &
Av. NEws 3801.
136 Pub. L. No. 92-560,86 Stat. 1174 (1972); Pub. L. No. 93-279, 88Stat.122 (1974); Pub. L. No.
93-621, 88 Stat. 2094 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-199,89 Stat. 1117 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-273,90 Stat.
375 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-407, 90 Stat. 1238 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-486, 90 Stat. 2327 (1976).
1 7
3 16 U .S.C. § 1271 (1976).
1 8
3 16 U .S.C. § 1273 (1976).
1
39 16 U .S.C. § 1273(b)(1)-(3)(1976).
140
U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL EQUALITY, 8TH ANNUAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QuALITY, 12 (U.S. Gov't Printing Offc. 1977).
141
In his May 23, 1977 Environmental Message to Congress, President Carter proposed
legislation for the addition of 8 river segments, totalling 1,303 miles, to the system. He also
proposed the designation of 20 river segments for study as potential additions.13 WEEKLY CoMP.
OF PREs. Doc. 783 & 791 (May 30, 1977).
142
16 U .S.C. § 1278(a)(1976).
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or otherwise in the construction of any water resources project that requires a
direct and adverse effect on the values for which such river was established, as
determined by the Secretary charged with its administration." 143 (emphasis
added). Section 7(b) extends the same prohibitions to designated potential
additions to the system for a ten-year period following enactment of the law
or for three complete fiscal years following any Act of Congress designating a
river as a potential addition, whichever is later. 144
Finally, section 7(c) of the Act establishes a consultation requirement. 145
Federal agencies are required to inform the appropriate Secretary of any
activities under their control which may affect rivers designated as potential
additions to the system. The language of section 7(a) indirectly establishes the
same consultation requirement for river segments already a part of the Wild
and Scenic system. 146
Several problems plague the implementation of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act. As is the case with the Endangered Species Act, two separate
agencies are responsible for the Act's administration. In addition, neither
agency has ever promulgated regulations explaining its interpretation of the
Act's implementation. Among those issues which could be clarified by a
regulation is the definition of "water resources project" under the act. The
legislative history of the Act would indicate that the term "water resources
project" under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act includes a greater variety of
projects than does the same term as used in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act. 147 Also unclear is the application of the Act to the secondary or growthinduced impacts of federal activities in the vicinity of a designated segment of
a study river.
In addition, the consultation process required by the Act is quite
cumbersome and time-consuming. The consultation must, in many cases, be
carried out at the headquarter level in Washington, D.C., between the
respective agencies and consequently it cannot be conducted directly through
the regional offices of the Forest Service or the Heritage Conservation and
Recreation Service. This can lead to lengthy delays as project review
documents are forwarded from the field to Washington for additional review
and final decision.
There has been little judicial review of the section 7 requirements of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The only case ruling directly on the requirements
of the statute is North Carolina v. Federal Power Commission. 148 The
question there was whether or not the Federal Power Commission could grant
a license for a hydroelectric power plant on the New River. The Appalachian
Power Company had been issued a license to construct such a project on June
14, 1974. After unsuccessfully seeking an administrative reconsideration of the
decision to grant the license, the State attempted the judicial review
embodied in this opinion. At that time the State of North Carolina had
143
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recommended that a segment of the New River be included in the Wild and
Scenic River system and in addition, the Department of the Interior was
conducting a study on the administrative request. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that although certain designated rivers were protected, section
7(h) did not apply to state-nominated rivers until they were actually accepted
into the system by the Secretary of Interior. Consequently, the hydroelectric
power project could have been validly licensed by the FPC.
Subsequent to this decision, Congress amended the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act to address the specific problems presented by the facts of the
case.l 49 Section 2(a) was modified to specifically include within the National
Wild and Scenic River system "that segment of the New River in North
Carolina extending from the confluence with Dog Creek downstream
approximately 26.5 miles to the Virginia State line." 150
As noted previously, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act establishes review
and consultation requirements in a number of instances. However, these
evaluation duties are combined with substantive standards which can dictate
the future of a proposed project. For example, section 7 of the Act is more
than a procedural review requirement. Sections 7(a) and 7(b) give to the
Secretary charged with the administration of a wild or scenic river the
authority to determine whether federal agencies' water resource projects
have "direct and adverse effects" on the protected values of designated Wild
and Scenic Rivers. 151 If he makes that determination, he may effectively veto
the proposed federal activity. 0 bviously, this provision of the Act extends the
impact of the statute far beyond the procedural review mandated by NEPA.
Given the consultation process developed for the Act, it is doubtful whether
NEPA documents, prepared and circulated through the NEPA process, can
satisfy the procedural requirements of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
Additional review or environmental assessment may be necessary to satisfy
the requirements of this Act. Future federal actions adversely affecting river
segments included in WSRA system will be subject to the standards and
consultation requirements of the Act. The potential power of this statute will
undoubtedly make future river designations a politically-charged and
contested decision.
V.

CoAsTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT Acr
OF 1972

The Coastal Zone Management Act 152 (CZMA) provides for assistance to
coastal state governments for the development and implementation of coastal
zone management plans. Coastal Zone Management plans have as their
149
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primary function land-use management for the coastal zone to assure the
orderly and environmentally sound development of these ecologically
sensitive areas. Pursuant to section 307 of the Act, federal and federallyassisted or licensed projects are required to be approved by the coastal state as
consistent with an approved coastal zone management plan. 153 The approval
procedure varies significantly with the type of federal project being
reviewed. For example, federal agencies conducting direct development
projects in the coastal zone are required to "insure that the project is, to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with the approved state management
programs." 154 However, activities in the coastal zone requiring only a federal
license or permit must obtain certification from the state coastal zone
authority "that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved
program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner consistent with
the program." 155 With respect to state and local government requests for
federal grant assistance, federal agencies may not approve proposed projects
that are "inconsistent with a coastal state's management program, except
upon a finding by the Secretary that such project is consistent with the
purposes of this chapter or necessary in the interest of national security."156
At the federal level, the coastal zone management program is administered by the Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of
Commerce. OCZM has recently promulgated regulations implementing the
consistency requirements. 157 Thirteen coastal zone management plans have
been approved to date. 158 However, many have been approved only within
the last year and consequently, there have been few consistency determinations made under the provisions of the Act. Court decisions interpreting
the Act have also been few.
In City & County of San Francisco v. United States, 159 the plaintiff
municipal corporations sought to lease an obsolete U.S. Navy shipyard. The
Navy, however, granted the lease to a private corporation which had
submitted a higher bid. The city and county then sued the Navy alleging eight
separate causes of action, one of which was founded upon the requirements of
the Coastal Zone Management Act. 160 The plaintiffs asserted that the lease to
the private firm did not conform to the plan of the Bay Conservation and
Development Commission. The district court granted the Government's
motion for summary judgment on the CZMA issue because the Navy's lease
had become effective more than seven and one half months prior to the formal
approval of the state's coastal zone management plan. Therefore, since
153
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federal actions need only be consistent with "approved" state plans and there
was no such plan in existence at the time of the lease, the court reasoned that
the Navy's action was proper.
Although the San Francisco case does not provide detailed guidance as to
the direction of future judicial review, it does illustrate several points. First, it
is clear that the section 307 "consistency" requirement is recognized as a
potential litigation tool for parties desiring to challenge federal agency
actions. In the San Francisco case, the plaintiffs obviously did not place
primary reliance upon the CZMA-based allegation challenging the Navy but
it was thought to apply to the Navy's leasing action. 161 Second, the
court considered the plan consistency issue as being distinct from any
question involving compliance with NEPA. It remains to be seen whether
future courts will permit environmental impact statements to serve as the
vehicle for agencies to assert that their activities are consistent with state
coastal zone plans.
It is interesting to note that in the San Francisco case the court classified the
Navy's lease of the tract as a "development project" and not a permit, license,
or other activity. If the State's plan had been in effect, the Navy would have
been obligated to "insure that the project is, to the maximum extent
practicable, consistent with [the State Plan]." 162 This finding would raise the
issue of which federal activities occurring in or affecting the coastal zone
would be subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of section
307. If the judiciary broadly construes the application of section 307,
conformity with the CZMA may become a frequently litigated issue separate
and apart from NEPA compliance. 163 In addition, substantial amounts of
agency resources will be needed to ascertain whether an action is consistent
with a state's plan "to the maximum extent practicable." The San Francisco
case indicates that the consistency standard of section 307 may become a
highly important planning requirement and litigation tool once the state
coastal management plans become effective.
One other recent decision considers the CZMA with respect to a major
federal undertaking and it reaffirms the views expressed above. In County of
Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 164 the Second Circuit reviewed the Interior
Department's authorization of a leasing program designed to encourage the
location and development of offshore oil and gas resources. The plaintiffs
challenged the sufficiency of the EIS prepared by the Department, asserting
that it did not contain sufficient environmental impact data to satisfy NEPA
requirements. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal government
had violated an extensive list of other statutes including section 307 of the
Coastal Zone Management Act. While rejecting the NEPA-based claims and
ruling in favor of the federal government, the court did discuss the future role
and requirements of the CZMA. In an effort to assure losing appellees that any
future off-shore energy development would be carefully regulated, the court
161
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noted that such development activites would be controlled by state coastal
zone plans "to which offshore lessees must adhere." 165 However, realizing that
no such plans yet existed in the Mid-Atlantic area, the court stated that by the
time the offshore oil and gas fields are discovered, the coastal zone plans will
be effective and that the "development plans submitted to the Secretary for
approval will be required under§ 307(c)(3) of CZMA to certify that they are
consistent with the relevant state's programs." 166
In the future it is not inconceivable that section 307 will become a point of
conflict between the federal government and state, local and private interests.
Federal activities needing EIS's may be found to be adequately complying
with NEPA but independently not satisfying the mandate of the CZMA. It is
clear that many aspects of the consistency provisions cannot be satisfied
simply through NEPA compliance for the federal activity. The NEPA
document can consider the impact of the proposed activity on the land and
water resources of the coastal zone and its relationship to the approved coastal
zone management plan. In most cases, however, this NEPA document will
not be sufficient in itself for review under the consistency section. Additional documentation will be required to complete the consistency review.
The timing of the consistency review may also vary from the timing of the
NEPA process. Also, litigation over the consistency issue alone could interrupt
any attempted coordination. The seriousness of this procedural problem
should become apparent as more states have their coastal management plans
approved and begin implementing the section 307 requirements.
VI.

CoNCLUSION

If recent developments are any indication, specialized environmental
review statutes will play an increasingly important role in federal project
planning and in litigation challenging federal activities. The decision of TVA
v. Hill indicates that the United States Supreme Court will give effect to the
substantantive requirements of these statutes when the legislative mandate is
clear. Moreover, the cases discussed above show that environmental and
other public interest litigants are becoming increasingly aware of potential
legislative and administrative approaches available to challenge federal
agency decision-making. This awareness will force federal officials to come to
grip with the possible spectrum of specialized environmental review
requirements applicable to their activities. Initially it will be crucial that these
government officials and their attorneys, and those interested private sector
parties, know of the existence of these legal obligations and what they require
of the agencies involved. With this step accomplished, the more difficult task
of redesigning or adapting federal planning, development, and decisionmaking will remain.
The accommodation of these additional environmental review requirements in federal planning processes may continue to pose serious
165
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difficulties. The prospects for project delays, legal uncertainty, extended
litigation and bureaucratic inaction are great. These problems will arise
because several fundamental issues concerning the implementation of the
specialized review statutes remain unresolved. These issues, and the opinions
of the authors as to possible means to resolve them, are briefly stated below.

A.

Substance v. Procedure

Federal agencies, the courts and, if necessary, the Congress should
attempt to define which environmental review statutes impose substantive
requirements and which are purely procedural in nature. Those statutes, or
sections of statutes, which determine how or if a project will be built must be
clearly identified. Congress should consider this in drafting new legislation
and in amending existing laws. Short of amendatory legislation, federal
agencies should face this issue when promulgating new regulations. Ignoring
these questions will not make them vanish. Administrative agencies must
examine their authorizing legislation closely and either publish new simplified
regulations corresponding to their actual mandate or seek additional authority
or classification from Congress. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and National
Historic Preservation Act are two candidates for administrative action of this
type. In the judicial forum, the courts should decide the issue of whether a
specialized statute applies to a given fact situation, rather than allowing their
decisions to avoid such a consideration or finding that NEPA embodies all
environmental concerns. The recent Supreme Court decision in the Hill case
may indicate that our highest court is prepared to face the question squarely.
Lower court decisions on the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act are not so
hopeful.

B. Relationship to NEPA
Again, federal agencies, the courts and Congress must address the
relationship of the specialized environmental review requirements to the
comprehensive review mandated by NEPA. Several specific problems must
be resolved. These include:
l. the extent to which NEPA procedures can be used to satisfy the
procedural requirements of the specialized statutes;
2. whether NEPA compliance can be substituted in full or in part for
compliance with specialized review statutes having substantive requirements;
3. the timing and sequence of compliance with NEPA procedures in
relation to compliance with other review procedures; i.e., which should be
satisfied first in order to meet legal requirements and to promote an efficient project review;
4. whether failure to comply with one review requirement affects the
status of compliance with other requirements;
5. whether conflicts exist between any of the environmental review
statutes and, if so, how such conflicts are to be resolved.
These are all critical questions for which answers must be forthcoming.
The questions focus upon the relationship between NEPA and the
independent environmental review statutes. In one sense the issue can be
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framed in terms of administrative reform- can NEPA serve to satisfy all
federal environmental obligations? But a greater substantive question
remains: do the independent statutes provide a degree of sensitivity and
protection to specialized environmental interests that is not achieved in the
NEPA environmental impact statement process? With the trend in cases
indicating increasing judicial willingness to find independent standards for
agency decision-making the answer to this question is to be answered in the
affirmative. If this pattern continues to develop and if the basic legislative
framework remains unaltered, agency conduct will be measured by multiple
standards of performance. This state of affairs is the anticipated result of
uncoordinated legislative activity on the part of Congress. Whether this trend
will ultimately act to the benefit of environmental quality remains to be seen.
It will undoubtedly place considerable stress upon the agencies' ability to
comply with diverse requirements.

C. Duplication of Requirements and
Division of Responsibility
Compliance with all of the federal environmental review requirements
applicable to a given federal activity usually involves a mass of paper,
sometimes lengthy administrative delays and general red tape. This is caused
in part by an unnecessary duplication of procedures and also by a division of
responsibility. One set of documents must be prepared to comply with one
statute or requirement, and another set containing much of the same
information, to comply with another statutory requirement. In addition,
responsibilities for requirements affecting a single, general area of the
environment, such as wildlife, are often shared by different agencies or even
different offices within the same agency.
To the extent that the law allows, or can be made to allow, responsibility
for administering environmental review requirements should be consolidated
in a single federal agency. When this is not possible, the number of agencies
involved should be kept to a minimum. A concerted effort should also be
made to reduce the number of separate documents that must be prepared and
the number of consultations that need to be made to satisfy the review
requirements. These modifications of procedure could improve the efficiency and quality of agency decision-making.

D. Resource Requirements
Adequate and continued funding should be made available to all
environmental review programs enacted by Congress. Those that Congress
does not want to fund should be repealed. Under-funded review programs
can do more harm than good to the goal of environmental protection. Review
agencies without adequate manpower and technical expertise often produce
paperwork burdens for federal project agencies with little beneficial impact
on the environment. Often these agencies and their review procedures are
perceived as mere procedural obstacles to federal projects. The procedures
having been complied with, the proposed federal activity is implemented in
basically the same fashion as originally planned. Because of resource
limitations, the reviewing agency can often make only perfunctory comments
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on the federal project and can take few steps to enforce any substantive
requirements found in the review statute. This latter responsibility is often left
to environmental organizations and other public interest groups through
litigation, a very inefficient way to implement environmental requirements
intended to shape early project planning.
Environmental review requirements are increasingly viewed in some
quarters as burdensome exercises designed to appease "little old ladies in
green sneakers" with little real importance to the environment. This attitude is
promoted in part by the failure of the federal government to come to grips
with problems of the type discussed above. The perceived emphasis of
procedure over substance and paperwork over real environmental protection
threatens to produce an environmental backlash of serious proportions. The
backlash will undoubtedly be felt in Congress where it may well result in
drastic amendments which could severely limit the environmental and planning benefits that these environmental review statutes provide. Positive
administrative reforms designed to streamline the environmental review
process without sacrificing the protection afforded by current statutes are by
far the preferable alternative. Without a prompt administrative response,
many of the accomplishments of the last decade could be lost.

